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IMPACT OF FLPMA
ON THE MINING INDUSTRY
I. WHAT DID CONGRESS DO?
A. Direct impact on Mining Law of 1872— 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (Section 302 of FLPMA)
1. No effect on mining law with four exceptions:
(a) Special provisions for mining claims in 
California Desert Conservation Area 
(subject to administrative regulation after 
as well as before patent)
(b) Special provisions for BLM Wilderness 
Review Program
(c) Secretarial power to promulgate regulations 
so as to prevent "unnecessary or undue deg­
radation of the public lands"
(d) Provisions implementing a federal registra­
tion and recordation system for unpatented 
mining claims and millsites
B. Indirect impacts (indirect but equally significant):
1. Right-of-way provisions
2. Public land exchange provisions
3. Land management planning provisions
4. Provisions limiting Executive Branch authority 
with respect to public land withdrawals
II. WHAT DID CONGRESS INTEND TO DO TO OR FOR MINING INDUSTRY?
A. S. Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975) (most 
comprehensive single Congressional report)
B. See 4-volume U. S. Government Printing Office
Publication No. 95-99 (1978), 1400 pages of
legislative history of FLPMA
C. Grew out of 1970 PLLRC Report: 1/3 of Nation's Land
D. Drafted against 1970-76 backdrop:
1. First, Department desire for comprehensive land 
management planning authority (principal purpose 
of statute)
2. Second, continual clamor by various groups for 
repeal of self-initiating 1872 statute in favor 
of a discretionary leasing system (repeal 
efforts generally supported by Department)
3. Third, major Department input into statute while 
Department was anticipating success of efforts 
to repeal General Mining Law
4. Finally, September 1975 Mining. Congress.Journalr 
Bennethum and Lee, "Is Our Account Overdrawn?" 
(2/3 of public lands effectively withdrawn)
E. Results for Mining Industry
1. Despite opportunity to do so, Congress did not 
repeal or make major structural changes in 1872 
statute, thereby at least temporarily ending 
repeal debate
2. Congress gave land management planning authority 
to Department, but also said that land manage­
ment planning decisions could not close public 
lands to the mining industry
3. Congress said public lands could be declared off 
limits to mining industry only through public 
land withdrawals, but also required a program of 
revocation of existing unnecessary withdrawals 
and imposed certain limitations on Executive 
Branch authority to make future withdrawals
F. Apparent End to Major Repeal Debate
1. To mining industry observers, statute and subse­
quent lack of further Congressional action ended 
major public land law debate of decade
2. While statute apparently had this effect, legis­
lative history has very few references to the 
focus of debate, which was repeal of 1872 statute
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3. One of few illuminating references appears in a 
statement at page 64 of Senate Report No. 
94-583 . The Senate Committee noted that "one of 
the most persistent and significant roadblocks 
to effective planning and management of most 
federal lands . . .  is the status of hardrock 
mining and mining claims on those lands under 
the Mining Law of 1872 . . . ." Committee 
quoted with seeming approval an article stating 
that the lack of a federal mining claim regis­
tration and recordation system "has obviously 
compromised the ability of public land managers 
to develop and administer a comprehensive plan 
which provides, in an even and balanced way, for 
all uses of the public lands." This was the 
justification given for what the Senate 
Committee described as "the federal mining claim 
recording system so necessary for Federal land 
planners and managers."
4. Curiously, while elimination of "stale" claims 
was a universally acknowledged benefit, the 
Senate Report never says exactly why a continu­
ing annual mining claim recordation system would 
otherwise aid federal land management planners 
who were specifically denied the authority to 
preclude mining through land management planning 
in the very same statute which created the 
recordation system
5. Is it possible that the continuing annual recor­
dation and registration system contained in 
Section 314 of FLPMA is a "legislative vestige" 
of the Department's anticipation of substitution 
of a discretionary leasing system for the 
General Mining Law of 1872? If the 1872 statute 
had indeed been repealed in favor of a discre­
tionary leasing system, the continuing mining 
claim recordation system would have served the 
obvious and useful purpose of identifying mining 
claims on public lands where land management 
plans were under consideration which would pre­
clude mining
6. I do not know the answer to the question posed 
immediately above, but I suspect that there is a 
strong possibility that the true purpose of the 
recordation system never was and never will be 
realized, unless and until the General Mining 
Law is repealed, an unlikely prospect at present
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7. In any event, so far the recordation system has 
undoubtedly had the most severe impact on the 
mining industry of any of the multiple provi­
sions of FLPMA. Leaving aside the question of 
exactly what Congress intended, I will turn to 
the question of what Congress actually did
III. WHAT CONGRESS DID WITH RESPECT TO REGISTRATION AND 
RECORDATION
A. Two Classes of Unpatented Mining Claims and Millsites
1. Located on or before 10/21/76 ("Old")
2. Located after 10/21/76 ("New")
B. First Requirement: Claim registration by filing with
BLM of Location Certificate which initiated the claim 
when it was recorded in local county records
1. Old: Registration on or before 10/22/79
2. New: Registration within 90 days after the date
of location (usually the date a notice of loca­
tion is posted on the ground)
C. Second Requirement: With respect to mining claims
(not millsites), annual recordation of claim mainte­
nance evidence in the form of either an Affidavit of 
Assessment Work or a Notice of Intention to Hold
1. Annual maintenance evidence must be recorded 
both in the local records and in the appropriate 
office of the BLM
2. Old: Unless two pending decisions are reversed
on appeal, maintenance evidence must have been 
recorded on or before October 22, 1979, and on 
or before December 30 of each calendar year after 197 9
3. New: On or before December 30 of each calendar
year ^after the calendar year during which the 
claim was originally located
4. Interpretations just expressed are result of 
regulatory revision and litigation; caution you 
to take to heart the warning which was given by 
IBLA in the Alaskamin case and which is quoted at Page 2 of your outline:
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The entire body of Departmental regula­
tions promulgated for the implementation 
of Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy 
Management Act of 1976 is so poorly 
expressed and obfuscatory as to defy 
assured comprehension even by competent 
lawyers, a fact which has been noted 
repeatedly in commentaries by knowledge­
able members of the private bar.
5. Under literal wording of Section 314, failure to 
comply results in "conclusive presumption" that 
claim has been abandoned by its owner and it is therefore void
IV. WHAT HAS RESULTED?
A. Claims declared void and property rights lost for 
failure to file required documents
B. Some void claims could not simply be relocated for 
various reasons:
1. Affected by public land withdrawal (e. a. , 
Wilderness Act, 12/31/83)
2. After claim location, specific mineral in ques­
tion made subject to another mineral disposal 
system (Oil shale and 1920 Leasing Act; common 
varieties of certain materials such as sand and 
gravel under the Mineral Materials Sales Act of 
1947 as amended in 1955)
3. Intervening third party rights (rival claimants)
C. Close scrutiny of Section 314 by attorneys
1. Long recognition that valid claim is constitu­
tionally protected property right (valid in 
sense of discovery, and mining law assumes dis­
covery precedes claim location)
2. Due to this constitutionally cognizable property 
right, it seemed that statute could be attacked 
on constitutional grounds under various theo­
ries, including the "equal protection" rationale 
which has been read into the 5th Amendment or 
the same Constitutional amendment's requirements 
of substantive and procedural due process and 
its prohibition of the taking of private
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property for public purposes without payment of 
just compensation
3. Because of the liceral wording of Section 314's 
reference to a "conclusive" determination with 
respect to abandonment, it seemed most suscepti­
ble to constitutional attack in terms of proce­
dural due process requirements
• 4. At common law, abandonment of a property right 
is related to the intent of the owner, and 
intent is a factual issue requiring proof
5. However, Section 314 creates an "irrebuttable 
presumption" because the failure to record cer­
tain documents results in a "conclusive" deter­
mination of abandonment. In other words, fail­
ure to file creates a presumption that the owner 
of the claim has actually abandoned it and the 
claimant is not given a hearing and opportunity 
to rebut the presumption with factual proof to 
the contrary
D. Law regarding irrebuttable presumptions
1. Stems from series of decisions by Supreme Court 
during 1970's
2. There is a violation of procedural due process 
requirements if a cognizable property right is 
lost without a hearing on the basis of a statu­
tory irrebuttable presumption if:
(a) The presumption is not necessarily univer­sally true? and
(b) The State has a feasible alternative means 
of making the critical determination
3. Like so many legal doctrines, some later cases 
appear to limit this standard of scrutiny for 
statutes effecting irrebuttable presumptions; at 
least at present, it continues to be used
E. Inevitable Litigation
1. Early frontal attacks
(a) Western Mining and
basically early frontal attacks by trade
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organizations arguing constitutional infirmities on the face of the statute (in 
Wegtern Mining) and its implementing admin­istrative regulations (Topaz Beryllium)
(b) Here, no actual loss of property right and 
corresponding refusals to declare 
Section 314 violative of Constitution under 
any set of conceivable circumstances
(c) Tenth Circuit decision in Topaz led to 
regulatory revision, and Ninth Circuit 
decision in Western Mining had formative 
effect on subsequent litigation; its hold­
ing of no violation of substantive due pro­
cess considerations moved constitutional 
arguments toward the area of procedural due 
process
2. The "right circumstances" to litigate
(a) "Old Claim" located and presumably valid 
before the passage of FLPMA
(b) Initially properly registered and subse­
quent attempts of some sort made to comply 
with maintenance evidence recordation 
requirements, so that "substantial 
compliance" argument is available
(c) Substantial financial investments in actual 
mining operations on the subject claim for 
equitable purposes
(d) Inability to relocate the claim for one of 
the reasons previously mentioned
3. Rogers (June 28, 1982) (cited in outline)
(a) Not ideal set of factual circumstances; 
only one of four desirable factual circum­
stances
(b) Old Claims declared void for failure to 
adequately comply with registration 
requirement on or before 10/22/79; claims 
could have been relocated and decision 
silent with respect to substantial 
investment or subsequent attempts to comply 
with annual recordation requirements
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(c) Nonetheless, District Court applied irre­buttable presumption analysis previously 
discussed and declared registration 
requirement of Section 314 unconstitutional 
due to lack of opportunity for hearing 
before loss of property right
(d) District Court found that the conclusive 
presumption of abandonment is not necessar­
ily or universally true in fact, and that 
it would not be overly burdensome to the 
Government to allow a hearing before a 
mining claim invalidated
(e) Roce r s not appealed because Justice 
Department failed to comply with 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1252, 1292, which require direct appeal 
to Supreme Court if District Court decision 
declares federal statute unconstitutional. 
United States improperly filed appeal in 
Circuit Court and time to appeal to Supreme 
Court expired
4. Locke (10/21/83) (copy in outline)
(a) Seemingly ideal factual circumstances; Old 
Claims properly registered in 1979, a good 
faith attempt to comply with the annual 
maintenance evidence recordation require­
ment in 1980, a substantial investment in 
the subject mining claims and mineral pro­
duction about $4 million in value through 
what is apparently a "mom and pop 
operation" and inability to relocate the 
claims for sand and gravel due to the 
intervention of the 1955 amendment of the 
Materials Sales Act regarding "common 
varieties"
(b) Claims declared void by the BLM because the 
1980 annual claim maintenance evidence was 
recorded with the BLM one day late (statute 
says "prior to 12/31," so regulations say 
"on or before December 30")
(c) District Court held that under these cir­
cumstances, annual recordation requirement 
violates p r ocedural due process 
requirements. In addition, Court found a 
"substantial compliance" exception in the
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statute and held that the claimants had 
substantially complied by filing their 
maintenance evidence one day late
(d) Court based its decision on conclusive pre­
sumption analysis; noted that the statutory 
presumption is not universally true and 
certainly not true as applied in this case, 
and agreed with the Rogers decision that an 
opportunity for a hearing would not be 
unduly burdensome on the Government. Made 
additional point that, since Government 
notifies claimants that their claims have 
been declared void, how can it be more dif­
ficult to notify them of a hearing?
(e) Locke has been appealed directly to 
U. S. Supreme Court. On Monday of this 
week, Court agreed to hear case and a 
briefing schedule will soon be established
(f) Justice Department is going to Supreme 
Court with Mom and Pop and Mom and Pop will 
undoubtedly be supported by friend of the 
court briefs filed by American Mining 
Congress and various State trade organiza­
tions
F. Non-Constitutional Litigation
1. ML .Industries y, .Watt (March 13 , 1984) (copy in outline)
2. Oregon, Portland v,. United States (April 19, 
1984) (copy in outline)
3. Sherman & Howard involvement
V. WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE?
A. Locke
1. Outcome of the case
(a) From standpoint of plaintiffs, almost best 
factual circumstances conceivable; if 
annual recordation requirements constitu­
tional here, perhaps entire Section 314 is 
constitutional (application of registration 
requirements to Old Claims may be
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salvageable on basis of no viable 
alternative in form of hearing)• On the 
other hand, if decision by District Court 
upheld, all Section 314 requirements are in 
jeopardy and Department has expressed deep 
concern about that potential result
(b) If entire Section 314 is placed in jeopardy 
because of Supreme Court decision in Locke, 
corrective legislation should be considered 
in order to avoid further litigation
(c) If corrective legislation is warranted, the 
Department must examine the registration/ 
recordation program and determine whether 
it is truly useful to land management plan­
ners or whether it is simply a legislative 
vestige of an era of expectations that the 
General Mining Law would be repealed
(d) If the recordation and registration 
requirements are truly useful in some sense 
to the BLM, then the obvious need is for a 
hearing requirement before invalidation of 
claims; the courts seem to be universally 
in accord that such a requirement would not 
be unduly burdensome to the Government
(e) If the registration/recordation require­
ments are not truly useful to the BLM, or 
if they are not useful enough to justify 
the expense of associated hearings, then 
the entire system should be junked and 
simply recognized as an unfortunate mistake
VI. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS/PREDICTIONS
A. 1982 Regulatory Revision Proposal (in outline)
1. Reagan/Watt
2. XL. S. v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599 (1968)
3. Pacific_Coast Molybdenum, 75 IBLA 16 (1983)
4. Assessment work proposal
B. Other Areas of FLPMA
1. Surface Management Regulations
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C. Other Speakers
1. Withdrawals and Access
2. Wilderness Program
3. Land Management Planning and Indirect Regulation
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Chapter II— Bureau of Land Management § 3833.0-1
generally not to exceed thirty (30) 
days. The authorized officer shall re­
quire immediate suspension of oper­
ations if noncompliance is causing en­
vironmental damage.
8 3827.6 Trespass.
Any mining operations conducted on 
lands within the Area without an ap­
proved plan of operations shall consti­
tute a trespass.
PART 3830— LOCATION OF MINING 
CLAIMS
Subpart 3831 —  Rights ta Minaret Lands
Sec.
3831.1 Manner of initiating rights under lo­
cations.
Subpart 3132— Who May Make Locations
3832.1 Qualifications.
Subperl 3833— Rece'dotion of Mining Claims 
and Filing Proof of Annual Assessment Work 
or Notice of Intention to Hold Mining Claims, 





3833.1 Recordation of mining claims. 
3B33.1-1 Manner of recordation—National
Park System units established before 
September 28. 1976.
3833.1- 2 Manner of recordation—Federal 
lands.
3833.1- 3 When recordation not required.
3833.2 Evidence of assessment work-notice 
of intention to hold a claim or site.
3833.2- 1 When filing required.
3833.2- 2 Form—evidence of assessment 
work.
3833.2- 3 Form—notice of intention to hold 
claim or site.
3833.2- 4 When evidence or notice not re­
quired.
3833.3 Notice of transfer of interest.
3833.4 Failure to file.
3833.5 Effect of recording and filing.
Subparl 3831— Right* to Mineral 
Land*
§3831.1 Manner of initiating rights under 
locations.
Rights to mineral lands, owned by 
the United States, are initiated by pro­
specting for minerals thereon, and. 
upon the discovery of minerals, by lo­
cating the lands upon which such dis­
covery has been made. A location is 
made by (a) staking the corners of the 
claim, except placer claims described 
by legal subdivision where State law 
permits locations without marking the 
boundaries of the claims on the 
ground, (b) posting notice of location 
thereon, and (c) complying with the 
State laws, regarding the recording of 
the location in the county recorder's 
office, discovery work. etc. As supple­
mental to the United States mining 
laws there are State statutes relative 
to location, manner of recording of 
mining claims, etc., in the State, which 
should also be observed in the location 
of mining claims. Information as to 
State laws can be obtained locally or 
from State officials.
[38 FR 24650. Sept. 10. 1973)
Subpart 3832— Who May Make 
Locations
8 3832.1 Qualifications.
Citizens of the United States, or 
those who have declared their inten­
tion to become such, including minors 
who have reached the age of discre­
tion and corporations organized under 
the laws of any State, may make 
mining locations. Agents may make lo­
cations for qualified locators.
[35 FR 9750. June 13. 1970]
Subpart 3833— Recordation of Mining 
Claims and Filing Proof of Annual 
Assessment Work or Notice of In­
tention to Hold Mining Claims, Mill 
or Tunnel Sites
Source: 42 FR 5300, Jan. 27, 1977. unless 
otherwise noted.
§ 3833.0-1 Purpose.
One purpose of these regulations is 
to establish procedures for the recor­
dation in the proper BLM office of un­
patented mining claims, mill sites, or 
tunnel sites on Federal lands, and for 
the filing in the same office of evi­
dence of performance of annual as­
sessment work or of a notice of inten­
tion to hold an unpatented mining 
claim. Another purpose is to notify the 
proper BLM office of the transfer of
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an interest in unpatented mining 
claims, mill sites or tunnel sites.
9 3833.0-2 Objectives.
An objective of these regulations is 
to determine the number and location 
of unpatented mining claims, mill 
sites, or tunnel sites located on Feder­
al lands to assist in the management 
of those lands and the mineral re­
sources therein. Other objectives are 
to remove the cloud on the title to 
these lands because they are subject 
to mining claims that may have been 
abandoned and to keep the BLM 
abreast of transfers of interest in un­
patented mining claims, mill sites or 
tunnel sites. These regulations are not 
intended to supersede or replace exist­
ing recording requirements under 
State law. except when specifically 
changed by the provisions of the Fed­
eral Land Policy and Management Act 
of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1701). and are not 
intended to make the BLM office the 
official recording office for all ancil­
lary documents (wills, liens, judg­
ments. etc.) involving an unpatented 
mining claim, mill site or tunnel site.
§ 3833.0-3 Authority.
(a) Subsections (a) and (b) of section 
314 of the Act require the recordation 
of unpatented mining claims and the 
filing of information concerning 
annual assessment work performed or 
a notice of intention to hold such a 
claim in the proper BLM office within 
specified time periods. Subsection (c) 
sets forth the consequences of the fail­
ure to file such information or docu­
ments within the time limits pre­
scribed.
(b) Section 8 of the Act of Septem­
ber 28. 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1901-1912). re­
quires that all unpatented mining 
claims within the boundaries of the 
National Park System shall be record­
ed with the Secretary within one year 
after the date of the Act and provides 
penalties for failure to record.
(c) Section 2319 of the Revised Stat­
utes (30 U.S.C. 22) provides that the 
exploration, location, and purchase of 
valuable mineral deposits shall be 
"under regulations prescribed by law," 
and section 2478 of the Revised Stat­
utes, as amended (43 U.S.C. 1201). pro­
§ 3833.0-2 lific  43— Public Lands: |n»tr.
vides that those regulations wni 
issued by the Secretary. 1 **
(d) The Secretary has general
sponsibility and authority concern^' 
public lands under 43 U.S.C. 2 and 
tion 310 of the Act. Sec-
(e) The Act of August 31, 1 9 51
U.S.C. 483a) and section 304(a) 0f tt} 
Federal Land Policy and Manager^! 
Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1734). eru
(42 FR 5300. Jan. 27. 1977. as amended 
FR 9722. Feb. 14. 19791
at
9 3833.0-5 Definitions.
As used in this subpart:
(a) "The Act" means the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 (Pub. L. 94-579; 90 Stat. 2743).
(b) "Unpatented mining claim" 
means a lode mining claim or a placer 
mining claim located under the Gener- 
al Mining Law of 1872. as amended oo 
U.S.C. 21-54). for which a patent 
under 30 U.S.C. 29 and 34 CFR pan 
3860 has not been issued.
(c) "Mill site" means any land locat­
ed under 30 U.S.C. 42.
(d) "Tunnel site" means a tunnel lo­
cated pursuant to 30 U.S.C. 27.
(e i  "Owner" means the person who 
is the holder of the right to sell or 
transfer all or any part of the unpa­
tented mining claim, mill or tunnel 
site. The owner shall be identified in 
the instruments required by these reg­
ulations by a notation on those instru­
ments.
(f) "Federal lands" means any lands 
or interest in lands owned by the 
United States, except lands within 
units of the National Park System, 
which are subject to location under 
the General Mining Law of 1872. 
supra, including, but not limited to. 
those lands within forest reservations 
in the National Forest System and 
wildlife refuges in the National Wild­
life Refuge System.
(g) "Proper BLM office" means the 
Bureau of Land Management office 
listed in § 1821.2-1( d ) of this title as 
having jurisdiction over the area in 
which the claims or sites are located.
(h) "Date of location" or “located" 
means the date determined by State 
law in the local jurisdiction in which 
the unpatented mining claim, mill or 
tunnel site is situated.
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(i) "Copy of the official record of the 
notice of certificate of location" means 
a legible reproduction or duplicate, 
except microfilm, of the original in­
strument of recordation of an unpa­
tented mining claim, mill or tunnel 
site which was or will be filed in the 
local jurisdiction where the claim or 
site is located or other evidence, ac­
ceptable to the proper BLM office, of 
such instrument of recordation. It also 
includes an exact reproduction, dupli­
cate or other acceptable evidence, 
except microfilm, of an amended in­
strument which may change or alter 
the description of the claim or site.
[42 FR 5300. Jan. 27, 1977, as amended at 44 
FR 9722. Feb. 14. 1979]
§ 3833.1 Recordation of mining claims.
§3833.1-1 Manner of recordation—Na­
tional Park System units established 
before September 2X. 197fi.
Any unpatented mining claim, mill 
site or tunnel site in any National 
Park System unit in existence on Sep­
tember 28. 1976. which was not record­
ed on or before September 28, 1977. in 
accordance with the Notice of October 
20. 1976 [41 FR 46357] or 36 CFR 9.5 
is. pursuant to section 8 of the Act of 
September 28. 1976 (16 U.S.C. 1907). 
conclusively presumed to be aban­
doned and shall be void.
[44 FR 20429. Apr. 5. 1979]
§ 3833.1-2 Manner of recordation—Feder­
al lands.
(a) The owner of an unpatented 
mining claim, mill site or tunnel site 
located on or before October 21. 1976. 
on Federal lands, excluding lands 
within units of the National Park 
System established before September 
28. 1976. but including lands within a 
national monument administered by 
the United States and Fish and Wild­
life Service or the United States 
Forest Service, shall file (file shall 
mean being received and date stamped 
by the proper BLM Office) on or 
before October 22. 1979. in the proper 
BLM Office, a copy of the official 
record of the notice or certificate of 
location of the claim or site filed 
under state law. If state law does not 
require the recordation of a notice or
certificate of location containing the 
information in paragraph (c) of this 
section shall be filed. Where the claim 
so recorded lies within a unit of the 
National Park System, a copy of the 
documents filed shall be provided to 
the Superintendent of the appropriate 
unit by the Bureau of Land Manage­
ment.
(b) The owner of an unpatented 
mining claim, mill site, or tunnel site 
located after October 21. 1976, on Fed­
eral land shall file (file shall mean 
being received and date stamped by 
the proper BLM office), within 90 days 
after the date of location of that claim 
in the proper BLM office a copy of the 
official record of the notice or certifi­
cate of location of the claim or site 
filed under state law or. if the state 
law does not require the recordation of 
a notice or certificate of location of 
the claim or site, a certificate of loca­
tion containing the information in 
paragraph (c) of this section. Where 
the claim so recorded lies within a unit 
of the National Park System, a copy of 
the documents filed shall be provided 
to the Superintendent of the appropri­
ate unit by the Bureau of Land Man­
agement.
(c) The copy of the notice or certifi­
cates filed in accordance with para­
graphs (a) and (b) of this section shall 
be supplemented by the following ad­
ditional information unless it is includ­
ed in the copy:
(1) The name or number of the 
claim or site, or both, if the claim or 
site has both:
(2) The name and current mailing 
address, if known, of the owner or 
owners of the claim or site:
(3) The type of claim or site;
(4) The date of location:
(5) For all claims or sites located on 
surveyed or unsurveyed lands, a de­
scription shall be furnished. This de­
scription shall recite, to the extent 
possible, the section(s). the approxi­
mate location of all or any part of the 
claim or site to within a 160 acre quad­
rant of the section (quarter section) or 
sections, if more than one is involved. 
In addition, there must be furnished 
the township, range, meridian and 
State obtained from an official survey 
plat or other U.S. Government map 
showing either the surveyed or pro-
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tracted U.S. Government grid, which­
ever is applicable:
(6) For all claims or sites located on 
surveyed or unsurveyed land, either a 
topographic map published by the 
U.S. Geological Survey on which there 
shall be depicted the location of the 
claim or site, or a narrative or sketch 
describing the claim or site with refer­
ence by appropriate tie to some topo­
graphic. hydrographic or man-made 
feature. Such map. narrative descrip­
tion or sketch shall set forth the 
boundaries and positions of the indi­
vidual claim or site with such accuracy 
as will permit the authorized officer of 
the agency administering the lands or 
the mineral interests in such lands to 
identify and locate the claim on the 
ground. More than one claim or site 
may be shown on a single map or de­
scribed in a single narrative or sketch 
if they are located in the same general 
area, so long as the individual claims 
or sites are clearly identified; and
(7) In place of the requirements of 
paragraphs (c)(5) and (6) of this sec­
tion. an approved mineral survey may 
be supplied.
(8) Nothing in the requirements for 
a map and description found in this 
section shall require the owner of a 
claim or site to employ a professional 
surveyor or engineer.
(d) Each claim or site filed shall be 
accompanied by a one time $5 service 
fee which is not returnable. A notice 
or certificate of location shall not be 
accepted if it is not accompanied by 
the service fee and shall be returned 
to the owner.
[42 FR 5300. Jan 27. 1977. as amended at 44 
FR 9722, Feb. 14. 1979; 44 FR 20430. Apr. 5. 
1979]
§ 3833.1-3 When recordation not required.
If the owner of an unpatented 
mining claim or mill site had on file in 
the proper BLM office on October 21. 
1976, an application for a mineral 
patent which contains the documents 
and information required in § 3833.1-2 
of this title, except if the application 
is for a patent for a placer claim which 
is located on surveyed lands and con­
forms to legal subdivisions, such appli­
cant need not comply with the re­
quirements of § 3833.1-2(c)(6) of this 
title, or if the owner of an unpatented
§ 3833.1-3
mining claim or mill site located on or 
before October 21. 1976. files in the 
proper BLM office an application for a 
mineral patent, as described above, on 
or before October 22. 1979. the filing 
of the application shall be deemed full 
compliance with the recordation re­
quirements of section 314(b) of the 
Act and the owner of that claim or site 
shall be exempt from the filing re­
quirements of § 3833.1. For purposes 
of complying with the requirement of 
§ 3833.2-l(a) of this title, upon notifi- 
cation to the claimant, the date of re­
cordation in the proper BLM office 
shall be October 21. 1976. for claims 
and sites included in mineral patent 
applications on file as of that date. 
The date on which the application was 
actually filed shall be the date of re­
cordation for all other claims and 
sites.
[44 FR 9722. Feb. 14. 1979]
§ 3833.2 Evidence of assessment work- 
notice of intention to hold a claim or 
site.
[44 FR 9723, Feb. 14. 1979]
§ 3833.2-1 When filing required.
(a) The owner of an unpatented 
mining claim located on Federal lands 
on or before October 21. 1976. shall 
file in the proper BLM office on or 
before October 22. 1979. or on or 
before December 30 of each calendar 
year following the calendar year of 
such recording, which ever date is 
sooner, evidence of annual assessment 
work performed during the preceding 
assessment year or a notice of inten­
tion to hold the mining claim.
(b) (1) Except as provided in para­
graph (b)(2) of this section, the owmer 
of an unpatented mining claim, mill 
site or tunnel site located within any 
unit of the National Park System shall 
file before October 22. 1979, and on or 
before December 30 of each calendar 
year after the year of recording (See 
36 CFR 9.5), a notice of intention to 
hold the mining claim, mill site or 
tunnel site. Such notice shall be in the 
form presecribed by § 3833.2-3 of this 
title and shall be filed with the proper 
BLM office. A copy of each such filing 
shall be provided to the Superintend-
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ent of the appropriate unit by the 
Bureau of Land Management.
(2) Where a claimant has received a 
permit under 36 CFR 9.5 to do assess­
ment work on a claim in a unit of the 
National Park System, the claimant 
may file with the Bureau of Land 
Management in lieu of the notice re­
quired by paragraph (b)(1) of this sec­
tion. evidence of assessment work in 
the form prescribed in § 3833.2-2 of 
this title. A copy of such filing shall be 
provided to the Superintendent of the 
appropriate unit by the Bureau of 
Land Management.
(c) The owner of an unpatented 
mining claim located on Federal lands 
excluding lands within a unit of the 
National Park System, but including 
lands within a national monument ad­
ministered by the United States Fish 
and Wildlife Service or the United 
States Forest Service, after October 
21. 1976. shall, on or before December 
30 of each calendar year following the 
calendar year in which such claim was 
located, file in the proper BLM office 
evidence of annual assessment work 
performed during the previous assess­
ment year or a notice of intention to 
hold the mining claim.
(d) The owner of a mill or tunnel 
site located on Federal lands, exclud­
ing lands within a unit of the National 
Park System but including lands 
within a national monument adminis­
tered by the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service or the United States 
Forest Service, shall file in the proper 
BLM office on or before December 30 
of each year following the year of re­
cording pursuant to § 3833.1-2 of this 
title, a notice of intention to hold the 
mill or tunnel site.
(44 FR 9723. Feb. 14, 1979. as amended at 44 
FR 20430. Apr. 5, 1979]
§ 3833.2-2 Form—evidence of assessment 
work.
Evidence of annual assessment work 
shall be in the form of either;
(a) An exact legible reproduction or 
duplicate, except microfilm, of the af­
fidavit of assessment work performed 
which was or will be filed for record 
pursuant to section 314(a) of the Act 
in the local jurisdiction of the State 
where the claim or group of claims is
located and recorded setting forth the 
following additional information:
(1) The serial number assigned to 
each claim by the authorized officer 
upon filing of the notice or certificate 
of location or patent application in the 
proper BLM office. Filing the serial 
number shall comply with the require­
ment in the act to file an additional 
description of the claim.
(2) Any change in the mailing ad­
dress. if known, of the owner or 
owners of the claim or claims; or
(b) An exact legible reproduction or 
duplicate, except microfilm, of the de­
tailed report concerning geological, 
geochemical and geophysical surveys 
provided for by the Act of September 
2. 1958 (30 U.S.C. 28-1) and filed for 
record pursuant to section 314(a)(1) of 
the Act in the local jurisdiction of the 
State where the claim or group of 
claims is located and recorded setting 
forth the following additional infor­
mation:
(1) The serial number assigned to 
each claim by the authorized officer 
upon filing in the proper BLM office 
of a copy of the official record of the 
notice or certificate of location or 
patent application; and
(2) Any change in the mailing ad­
dress. if known, of the owner or 
owners of the claim.
(42 FR 5300. Jan. 27. 1977, as amended at 44 
FR 9723. Feb. 14. 1979]
S 3833.2-3 Form—notice of intention to 
hold claim or site.
(a) A notice of intention to hold a 
mining claim or group of mining 
claims shall be in the form of either 
(1) an exact legible reproduction or 
duplicate, except microfilm, of a letter 
signed by the owner of a claim or his 
agent filed for record pursuant to sec­
tion 314(a)(1) of the Act in the local 
jurisdiction of the State where the 
claim is located and recorded setting 
forth the following information:
(i) The serial number assigned to 
each claim by the authorized officer 
upon filing in the proper BLM office 
of a copy of the notice or certificate of 
location. Filing the serial number shall 
comply with the requirement in the 
act to file an additional description of 
the claim;
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(ii) Any change in the mailing ad­
dress. if known, of the owner or 
owners of the claim;
Ciii) A statement that the claim is 
held and claimed by the owner(s) for 
the valuable mineral contained there­
in;
(iv) A statement that the owner(s) 
intend to continue development of the 
claim; and
(v) The reason that the annual as­
sessment work has not been performed 
or an affidavit of assessment work per­
formed or a detailed report of geologi­
cal. geochemical or geophysical survey 
under § 3833.2-2. has not been filed or
(2) The decision on file in the proper 
BLM office which granted a defer­
ment of the annual assessment work 
required by 30 U.S.C. 28, so long as the 
decision is in effect on the date re­
quired for filing a notice of intention 
to hold a mining claim under § 3833.2- 
1 of this title or a petition for defer­
ment. a copy of which has been re­
corded with the appropriate local 
office, which has not been acted on by 
the authorized officer.
(b) A notice of intention to hold a 
mill or tunnel site(s) shall be in the 
form of a letter signed by the owner or 
owners of such sites or their agent set­
ting forth the following information:
(1) The serial number assigned to 
each site by the authorized officer 
upon filing in the proper BLM office 
of a copy of the official record of the 
notice or certificate of location;
(2) Any change in the mailing ad­
dress. if known, of the owner or 
owners of the site(s): and
(3) In the case of a mill site, a state­
ment that a claim-related site will con­
tinue to be used for mining or milling 
purposes or that an independent mill 
site will continue to be used for the 
purposes of a quartz mill or reduction 
works; or
(4) In the case of a tunnel site, a 
statement that the owmer(s) will con­
tinue to prosecute work on the tunnel 
with reasonable diligence for the dis­
covery or development of the vein or 
lode.
[44 FR 9723, Feb. 14. 1979]
§ 3833.2-4
§ 3833.2-4 When evidence or notice not re 
quired.
Evidence of annual assessment work 
performed or a notice of intention t0 
hold a mining claim need not be fije  ̂
on unpatented mining claims or min 
sites for which application for mineral 
patent which complies with 43 CFft 
Part 3860 has been filed and final cer­
tificate has been issued. (See 43 CFp 
3851.5). The filing of an application 
and issuance of the final certificate 
will be deemed full compliance with 
the requirements of section 314(a) 0f 
the Act and the owner of that claim or 
site shall be exempt from the filing re­
quirements of § 3833.2-1.
§ 3833.3 Notice of transfer of interest.
(a) Whenever the owner of an unpa- 
tented mining claim, mill site or 
tunnel site, which has been recorded 
in accordance with § 3833.1-2, sells, as- 
signs, or otherwise conveys all or any 
part of his interest in the claim, hi's 
transferee shall file in the proper 
BLM office within 60 days after the 
completion of the transfer the follow­
ing information:
(1) The serial number assigned to 
the claim by the authorized officer 
upon filing of a copy of the official 
record of the notice or certificate of 
location in the proper BLM office: and
(2) The name and mailing address of 
the person(s) to whom an interest in 
the claim has been sold, assigned, or 
otherwise transferred.
(b) Whenever any person acquires 
an interest through inheritance in an 
unpatented mining claim, mill site, or 
tunnel site recorded in accordance 
with § 3833.1. he shall file in the 
proper BLM office within 60 days 
after completion of the transfer the 
information required by paragraph <a> 
of this section.
§ 3833.1 Failure to file.
(a) The failure to file an instrument 
required by §§ 3833.1-2 (a). <b). and 
3833.2-1 of this title within the time 
periods prescribed therein, shall be 
deemed conclusively to constitute an 
abandonment of the mining claim, 
mill or tunnel site and it shall be void.
(b) The fact that an instrument is 
filed in accordance with other laws
Title 43— Public Lands: lnt#rj0r
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permitting filing or recording thereof c 
and is defective or not timely filed for c 
record under those laws, or the fact r 
that an instrument is filed for record t 
under this subpart by or on behalf of x 
some, but not all of the owners of the s 
mining claim, mill site, or tunnel site, 8 
shall not be considered failure to file r 
an instrument under this subpart.
[42 FR 5200. Jan. 27. 1977. as amended at 44 I 
FR 9723, Feb. 14. 1979] {
§3833.5 Effect of recording and filing. j
(a) Recordation or application in- t 
volving an unpatented mining claim, j 
mill site, or tunnel site by itself shall j 
not render valid any claim which . 
would not be otherwise valid under ap- J 
plicable law and does not give the . 
owner any rights he is not otherwise , 
entitled to by law.
(b) Nothing in this subpart shall be 1 
construed as a waiver of the assess- ’ 
ment work requirements of section 1 
2324 of the Revised Statutes, as < 
amended (30 U.S.C. 28). Compliance i 
with the requirements of this subpart I 
shall be in addition to and not a sub­
stitute for compliance with the re­
quirements of section 2324 of the Re­
vised Statutes and with laws and regu- ; 
lations issued by any State or other 
authority relating to performance of 
annual assessment work.
(c) Filing of instruments pertaining 
to mining claims under other Federal 
law with the BLM or other Federal 
agency shall not excuse the filings re­
quired by this subpart and filings 
under this subpart shall not excuse 
the filing of instruments pertaining to 
mining claims under any other Feder­
al law, except that filing a notice or 
certificate of location or an affidavit 
of annual assessment work under this 
subpart which is marked by the owner 
as also being filed under the Act of 
April 8, 1948 (62 Stat. 162) or the Act 
of August 11, 1955 (30 U.S.C. 621-625). 
will satisfy the recording requirement 
for O & C lands under 43 CFR Sub­
part 3821 and Pub. L. 359 lands under 
43 CFR Part 3730. or as provided in 
§ 3833.2-l(b) of this title.
(d) In the case of any action or con­
test affecting an unpatented mining 
claim, mill or tunnel site, only those
Chapter II— Bureau of Lend Management
owners who have recorded their claim 
or site pursuant to § 3833.1-2 or filed a 
notice of transfer of interest pursuant 
to § 3833.3, shall be considered by the 
United States as parties whose rights 
are affected by such action or contest 
and shall be personally notified. All 
methods reasonably calculated to 
insure that those parties receive actual 
notice of the action or contest shall be 
employed. If those methods are not 
successful, the interested parties shall 
be notified by publication in accord­
ance with 43 CFR 4.450. Owners who 
have not recorded a claim or site or 
filed a notice of transfer shall hot be 
personally served and will be bound by 
any contest proceeding even though 
they have not been personally served. 
This section applies to all unpatented 
mining claims, mill or tunnel sites lo­
cated after October 21, 1976. and shall 
apply to such claims or sites located 
on or before October 21. 1976. only 
after they have been recorded pursu­
ant to § 3833.1-2 of this title.
(e) Actual notice of an unpatented 
mining claim or mill or tunnel site by 
any employee or officer of the United 
States shall not exempt the claim or 
site from the requirements of this sub­
part.
(f) Failure of the government to 
notify an owner upon his filing or re­
cording of a claim or site under this 
subpart that such claim or site is locat­
ed on lands not subject to location or 
otherwise void for failure to comply 
with Federal or State law or regula­
tions shall not prevent the govern­
ment from later challenging the valid­
ity of or declaring void such claim or 
site in accordance with due process of 
law.
(g) Any person who files an instru­
ment required by these regulations 
knowing the same to contain any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statement or 
entry, may be subject to criminal pen­
alties under 18 U.S.C. 1001.
[42 FR 5200. Jan. 27. 1977. as amended at 44 
FR 9723. Feb. 14, 1979)
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LOCKE, SAM BUCCAMBUSO, and 
TONY BUCCAMBUSO,
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, U!
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IOR, JAMES WATT, Secretary of the 
Interior, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, 
and ROBERT F. BURFORD, Director' of 










The primary issue raised by the parties' cross-motions 
for summary judgment is the constitutionality of 43 U.S.C. §
1744(a) and (c). This statute creates an irrebuttable presump­
tion that mining claims are abandoned if the miner fails to timely 
file an annual proof of labor (assessment notice). After care­
ful consideration, we conclude that this statute violates the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, we conclude 
that the plaintiffs here have substantially complied with the 
statute regardless -of its constitutionality.
Plaintiffs, Madison and Rosalie Locke, et al. (Lockes),






















duce gravel and building materials. These claims are located in 
the state of Nevada on public land belonging to the United States 
Government. The Lockes have successfully earned their livelihood 
by mining these claims since 1960. During that period these . .
claims have produced approximately $4,000,000 in materials, with/ 
over $1,000,000 of that being produced during the 1979-1980 -■ re­
assessment year. i- . .
In 1976, the United States enacted the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act, Pub.L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 
(codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82) (FLPMA) which required the 
Lockes to register their unpatented claims with the Bureau of 
Land Management (BUI) by October 21, 1979. They complied fully 
with this initial filing requirement on October 19, 1979. Each 
calendar year thereafter, FLPMA further requires a filing of the 
assessment notice (showing that $100 worth of labor has been per­
formed on the claim during the assessment year) "prior to" 
December 31. 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a). It is this provision which
creates the controversy here.
In an effort to comply fully with this provision, the 
Lockes sent their daughter, who was working in their business 
office, to the Ely office of the BLM. There she inquired as to 
the procedure for filing the assessment notice. She was told 
that the documents should be filed at the Reno BLM office "on or 
before December 31, 1980." Affidavit of Laura C. Locke, August 
28, 1981, para. 3. (The identity of the federal employee who 
allegedly gave this, advice is unknown. Therefore, we place no 
reliance on the advice. The uncontradicted evidence of the in­






























The Lockes then chose to hand-deliver the documents to assure 
their delivery and, on-December 31, 1980, the assessment notices 
were filed at the Reno BLM office.
On April 4, 1981, the Lockes received notice that their 
mining claims were declared "abandoned and void" for failure to 
comply with 43 CFR § 3833.2-1 (the BLM's regulation promulgated! y- 
under 43 U.S.C. §1744 which requires filing the assessment not­
ices "on of before December 30" of each calendar year. 43 CFR 
§ 3833.2-1(a) (1932)). On May 1, 1981, they appealed the declar­
ation of abandonment to the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). 
That body ruled on June 25, 1982 that the Lockes had missed the 
December 30, 1980 deadline and thus their claims were forfeited. 
The IBLA refused to address the Lockes’ constitutional arguments. 
They then instituted this action to challenge the constitution­
ality of 43 U.S.C. § 1744 as depriving them of procedural due 
process under the Fifth Amendment.
In order to establish a deprivation of their due pro­
cess rights, the Lockes must first show that the laws creating 
these rights•give rise to a "legitimate claim of entitlement." 
Memphis Light, Gas and Water District v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 12 
(1978). The Supreme Court has held that unpatented mining claims-; 
are a possessory mineral interest in land, as well as "property...- 
in the fullest sense of that term." Wilbur v. United States ex 
rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 317 (1930); see also, Best v. Hum­
boldt Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335 (1963). Similarly, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently concluded that the holder of an 
unpatented mining claim has a property right: "[b]ecause an

























in the owners a possessory interest in the land, the loss of such 
an interest would constitute a substantial injury.” Western 
Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 628 (1981) (citations'omit-, 
ted). Thus, there can be little doubt that the Lockes’ un- 
patented claims rise to the level of a property interest suffi- 
cient to warrant due process protection. . , . . . ‘••0'
The Lockes contend that the language of 43 U.S.C. § ' 
1744, establishing conclusively that they have abandoned their 
claims, is tantamount to declaring a forfeiture of their claims. 
They note that, although the BLM has recommended that they re­
locate their claims, it is uncontroverted that they are precluded 
from doing so by 30 U.S.C. 5 611, the so-called "Common Varieties 
Act." Thus, they are prevented from mining their old claims and 
at the same time from relocating the claims-
The government# however, contends that the term "aban­
donment" in the statute is not the same as "forfeiture," and thus 
an extinguishment of the Lockes' rights does not occur merely by 
operation of the presumption. This reasoning is not persuasive. 
The American'Law of Mining distinguishes between abandonment and 
forfeiture in Section 8.2 of Volume 2 by stating:
Although there is a clear distinction between v.V.f 
abandonment and forfeiture, the terms are fre- -.̂—  
guently used as though they were interchangeable.- 
The resulting confusion is compounded by sta- ■ '
tutes which provide that certain acts, unaccom­
panied by the requisite intent, shall consti­
tute an abandonment. . . .  To show abandonment, 
the intent of the claimant must be determined; 
to show forfeiture, only noncompliance with the 
requirements of law must be shown. 2
2 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, The American Law of Min­






























The statute creates a forfeiture of plaintiffs' rights 
in the mining claims since they at no time evidenced an intent to 
abandon those claims. This forfeiture extinguishes their pre- 
viously valid interests and results in a taking of their property 
sufficient to trigger the due process protections of the Fifth - 
Amendment. :
After establishing the existence and loss of t h e i r v  • 
rights in the subject claims, we turn to what quality of procedu­
ral process is "due" the Lockes before their property rights may 
be extinguished. Some guidance in this regard can be-drawn from 
the law prior to the passage of FLPMA. In 1920, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the holder of an unpatented mining claim posses­
ses a property right worthy of strong due process protections:
[o]fr course, the land department [BLM] 
has no power to strike down a claim arbi­
trarily, but so long as the legal title 
remains in -the government it does have 
power, after proper notice and upon ade­
quate hearing, to determine whether the 
claim is valid and, if it be found in­
valid, to declare it null and void.
Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 460 (1920) (emphasis 
added).. Thus, pre-FLPMA miners were entitled at the least to 
notice and -a hearing prior to forfeiture of their claims. ■
In determining which procedural safeguards must be 
afforded post-FLPMA miners, this.Court would normally consider 
the extent to which they might suffer grievous loss, the nature 
of the governmental function involved, and the nature of the pri­
vate interest affected. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481- 
82 (1972). But, where the statute in question creates an irre­























presumption before balancing these factors. Vlandis v. Kline,■
412 U.S. 441/ 452 (1973). The Supreme Court in Vlandis v. Kline 
established a two-prong test for the presumption analysis. Id.
If "'the presumption is not necessarily or universally true- in . 
fact' and the government has available 'reasonable alternative-.• 
means of making the crucial determination,*" then due process 
demands a hearing to rebut the presumption. Rogers v. United- 
States, No. 80-114, slip op. at 10 (D.'Mont. June 23, 1982)
(quoting Vlandis v. Kline, supra, 412 U.S. at 452); see also, 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (due process hear­
ing required to rebut conclusive presumption that unmarried 
father was unfit as a parent since this presumption not univer­
sally true)'. -
The present case perfectly illustrates a presumption 
that is not necessarily or universally true in fact. The Lockes 
mined over $1,000,000 worth of materials from their "abandoned" 
mines during the 1979-80 assessment year. They filed proofs of 
annual labor with the White Pine County Recorder on August 26, 
1980. They filed the proper documents at the Reno office of the 
BLM on December 31, 1980, one day after the December 30, 1980 
deadline. It would be absurd in light'of these facts to conclude-
• * • • tthat the Lockes intended tp abandon their claims. Thus, they-'-rVi-̂  
have met the first prong of the Vlandis test. \'."’V
The second prong of the Vlandis test concerns the gov-' 
ernment's ability to make a reasonable determination of whether 
the fact(s) presumed actually exist. . At the outset we note the 
government's argument that the Supreme Court case of Weinberger 























hearing to rebut the conclusive presumption of abandonment. Al­
though at first blush the Saifi case may appear to contradict 
Vlandis, there is a clear basis for distinguishing the two.
In Vlandis, a student whose address was listed as out ■ 
of state during the year preceding his enrollment in a Connecti- / 
cut state university was conclusively presumed to be a non-’. ;V'- 1 
resident. This presumption continued for as long as the student 
attended Connecticut schools, resulting in a higher tuition for 
that student throughout his academic career. Vlandis v. Kline, 
supra, 412 U.S. at 442-44. A rather simple determination of the 
actual residency of each student would have been feasible. Id. 
at 451-52. ■
Conversely, in Saifi, the presumption was that a mer- 
riage was a "sham” for Social Security purposes if entered into 
within nine months prior to the death of one spouse. This pre­
sumption operated to deprive surviving spouses of Social Security 
payments they would have received had the marriage occurred ten 
months prior to death. The court upheld the presumption and 
ruled that no prior hearing was required to rebut it. Writing 
for the court, Justice Rehnquist noted that, although the statute ' 
undoubtedly excluded some deserving claimants, "[it is not] -at.', 
all clear that individual determinations could effectively filter 
out sham arrangements, since neither marital intent, life expec­
tancy, nor knowledge of terminal illness has been shown by appel­
lees to be'reliably determinable.” Saifi, supra, 422 U.S. at 
782-83 (footnote omitted). Thus, a prior hearing could not have 
reasonably determined the fact presumed in Saifi.





















those of Vlandis, where individual determinations were clearly 
possible. Unlike the Saifi case, this objective requirement is 
easily determinable at a hearing. In addition, we agree with the 
Montana district court that such a hearing would not be overly 
burdensome to the BLM. Rogers v. United States, supra, No. 80-14, 
slip. op. at 10-11. "[I]t is not asking too much of the govern— -%
ment to provide the holder of property in the form of an unpat— **7' 
ented mining claim a heaxing before the BLM upon whether he has 
abandoned his mining claim." Id.
We therefore conclude that the second prong of Vlandis, 
the existence of a reasonable alternative means of making the 
factual determination, is likewise met in this case. ..Since the 
Lockes satisfy both parts of the Vlandis test, it follows that 
they are entitled to a pre-rforfeiture hearing. Vlandis v. Kline, 
supra, 412 U.S. at 452.
In agreeing with the Rogers case concerning procedural 
due process, however, we note that Rogers dealt with the initial 
filing requirement of 43 U.S.C. § 1744 instead of the subsequent 
annual filings at issue here. This important distinction, which 
strengthens the Lockes' right to a hearing, is highlighted by 
the legislative history of Section 1744 and the Act of which it 
is a part. V . v :/H
The mining provisions of FLPMA trace their original 
roots to a report prepared in 1970 by the Public Land Law Review 
Commission (PLLRC). The PLLRC report established the need for a 
uniform system of mining claim recordation. "The General Mining 
Law currently requires compliance with location and discovery re­






























and many are obsolete or archaic in light of modern technology." 
PLLRC/ One Third the Nation’s Land at 130' (1970). The purpose for 
establishing this new uniform system was to clear abandoned 
claims-from public lands. "Congress should establish a fair ;'t 
notice procedure (a) to clear the public lands of long-dormant"..̂ *;, 
mining claims. . . . Clearing the record of an. estimated 5^5 ’v.'f
million long-dormant'claims would assist in achieving more ef-fi---:; 
cient land planning and management by Federal agencies." Id.
The recommendations of the PLLRC were later incorporated 
in Senate Bill 507 (94th Cong., 2nd Sess.J, which finally was 
amended’and passed as FLPMA. The Senate report from the Commit­
tee on Interior and Insular Affairs regarding S 507 further demon­
strates that the purpose of 43 U.S.C. § 1744 was to clear long- 
dormant claims:
[T]he Committee did address a particular 
procedural-problem concerning the regis- 
. tration of mining claims - a problem which
is particularly frustrating to the public 
land manager. The source of this problem 
is what is often termed "stale claims". There - 
is no provision in the 1872 Mining Law, as 
amended, requiring notice to the Federal 
government by a mining claimant of the loca­
tion of his claim. 'The mining law only re­
quires compliance with local recording re­
quirements, which usually means simply an • 
entry in the general county land records.
Consequently, Federal land managers do not 
have an easy way of discovering which Fed- 
eral lands are' subject to either valid or /''T'X'V-
invalid mining claim locations. According 
to some estimates, there are presently more ' —  
than 6,000,000 unpatented claims on the 
public lands, excluding national forests, 
and more than half of the units of the 
National Forest System are reputedly covered 
by mining claims.- Of course, the vast major­
ity of these claims will never be pursued, 
and do not directly interfere with land manage­
ment. They do, however, create significant 































S.Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 65 (1975) (footnote 
omitted).
In order to clear these abandoned claims, Congress used 
the conclusive presumption of 43 U.S.C. § 1744, since giving 
notice to individual miners would have involved the awesome task 
of searching every local title record.
In this case, the initial filing has occurred. There--f 
is no longer a burden on the government to ascertain the identity 
of the miner since they already have a file with his name on it.
An inquiry as to whether the miner intends to abandon his claim 
could easily occur by letter. In fact, the BLM presently noti­
fies by mail each miner failing to file the annual assessment 
notice that their claim has been declared "abandoned and void."
Why then would it be more difficult to notify them that they have, 
failed to comply with 43 U.S.C. § 1744 prior to forfeiture?
And, if abandonment is in dispute, how difficult would it be' for 
the BLM to offer miners a pre-forfeiture hearing on whether they 
have performed the minimum assessment work necessary to keep 
their claim(s) active? Without these procedural safeguards, 43 
U.S.C. § 1744 no longer serves its intended purpose of clearing 
public lands of abandoned claims. Instead, it becomes a conven— ■ 
ient device for the government to reclaim established mines for’ 
profit at the expense of unprotected and unwary miners. This is ' 
true even though those miners have attempted in good faith to 
comply with every letter of the statute.
In addition, even if the requirement of a pre-forfeiture 
notice and hearing did increase the steps necessary for the BLM 























Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.’ 
The [government's] interest in administrative ease and certainty 
cannot, in and of itself, save the conclusive presumption from 
invalidity under the Due Process Clause where there are other. . 
reasonable and practicable means of establishing the pertinent1 ;- 
facts on which the [government’s] objective is premised."’ VIandis 
v. Kline, supra, 412 D.S. at 451 (quoting from Stanley v. Illi­
nois , supra, 405 U.S. at 656) (citation omitted). It seems clear 
that in this case there are other reasonable and practicable 
methods for establishing whether a miner intends to' abandon his 
claim by not timely filing his assessment notice. It. also seems 
clear that the Lockes have not intended to abandon their claims 
by filing one day late.
We therefore grant the Lockes' motion for summary judg­
ment and hold that 43 U.S.C. § 1744 is an unconstitutional viola­
tion of procedural due process insofar as it creates an irrebut­
table presumption of abandonment for failure to timely file the 
annual assessment notice.
Even if we concluded that the Lockes had not been de­
prived of their due process rights, we would still grant their 
motion for summary judgment based on the legislative history ̂ of^f- 
43 U.S.C. § 1744 as outlined above. Although that statute seems-*7 
to create a conclusive presumption of abandonment where the - 
assessment notice is not timely filed, this construction does
- V
1/ "The failure to file such instruments as required by subsec­
tions (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively 































not comport with a reasonable reading of the statute’s legisla­
tive history or the law prior to FLPMA. As Judge Learned Hand 
stated: "it is a commonplace that a literal interpretation of
the words of a statute is not always a safe guide to its meaning;." 
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc, v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,;489 
(2d Cir^ 1960). The Supreme Court has also held that M[i]t is a J  
familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the sta- - 
tuteand yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." Holy Trinity 
Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
It seems abundantly clear from the history of Section 
1744 that it was designed to clear the land of "stale" and "long- 
dormant" claims. In order to do this, miners were given three 
years to file their location notices with the'BLM. Once this 
occurred, and those failing to file lost their claims, the pur­
pose of the statute was met. There is no evidence in FLPMA’s vol­
uminous history that Congress intended to utilize the annual 
filings ,to clear these long-dormant claims. Instead, the evi­
dence indicates that the annual filings were designed to main­
tain a current index of non-patented claims merely for•the conven­
ience of federal land managers. S.Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong’..,/
2nd Sess. 65 (1975). In essence, 43 U.S.C. § 1744 simply added '.. \ 
a federal recording requirement to the existing General Mining 
Law provision mandating local recordation of assessment notices.
In fact, to satisfy the assessment notice regulations, miners 
file the exact same documents with both the county recorder's 
office and the BLM. 43 C.F.R. § 3833.2-1 (1982).























at 30 U.S.C. § 28/ has been the subject of several Supreme Court
cases. The more significant of these have held that "substantial
compliance" with the assessment notice requirement was sufficient
to satisfy the statute, since "the 'possessory title' of the':jV'*T
claimant, granted by 30 U.S.C. § 26, [may] not be d i s t u r b e d ' o n '
flimsy or'insubstantial grounds." Hickel v. Shale Oil Co., 4 00 i,"
U.S. 48, 57 (1970) ; see also, Wilbur v. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306
(1930), and Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U.
S. 639 (1935). . After Hickel v. Shale Oil Corp., the language of
the BLM’s assessment work regulation was amended to read that 
• • 2/  substantial compliance was all that was required.
£/ Before 1972, the regulation provided:
. § 3841.3 Failure to perform assessment work.
Failure to make the expenditure or perform the .
' labor required upon a location made before or
since May 10, 1872 will subject a claim to relo­
cation unless the original locator, his heirs, 
assigns, or legal representatives have resumed 
"■ work after such failure and before relocation.
After 1972, the regulation provided, and still provides:
§ 3851.3 Effect of failure to perform assessment 
work. ;
(a) Failure of a mining claimant to comply sub 
stantially with the requirement of an annual ex- '• 
penditure of $100 in labor or improvements on a 
claim imposed by section 2324 of the Revised Sta­
tutes (30 U.S.C. 28) will render the claim sub­
ject to cancellation.
(b) Failure to make the expenditure or perform 
the labor required upon a location will subject
a claim to relocation unless the original locator, 
his heirs, assigns, or legal representatives have 































It seems to us anomolous that the government should 
insist upon the strict forfeiture declared by 43 U.S.C. § 1744 
and at the same time retain the regulations under 30 U.S.C. 28 
recognizing substantial compliance as the standard.
The history of FLPMA, the stated purpose of 43 U.S.C.'t\. 
§ 1744, and the Supreme Court precedent of Hickel, all indicate;*'// 
that the standard to be applied to assessment notice requirements 
is substantial compliance. Measured against this, the Lockes 
have satisfied their statutory duties under Section 1744 by filing 
their notices one day late.
In consideration of the premises,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment is hereby granted and defendants' motion for 
summary judgment is hereby denied.
DATED October 19,’ 1983.
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To All SD's, DSC
From Director
Subject: Issuance of Abandoned and Void Decisions for Late Annual
•Filings under 43 CFR. 3833.2-l(a) and (b), (43 USC 1744(a))
On October 21, 1983, the Federal District Court for Nevada 
(Locke v. United States, Civil No. R-82-297 BRT) found Section 
314(c) of FLPMA unconstitutional as to the conclusive abandonment of 
a mining claim for untimely filing of evidence of annual assessment 
work. On November 23, 1983, the United States appealed this ruling 
directly to the Supreme Court. Oral arguments will probably be 
heard this spring, and the Supreme Court may decide the case by 
mid-summer of 1984. Our main reason for the appeal is our desire to 
have a nationwide decision on the matter which will bring uniformity 
to the way the State and Federal Courts apply the law.
In view of the current uncertainty as to the constitutionality of 
Section 314(c) of FLPMA (43 USC 1744(c)), we arê  instructing all 
Field Offices not to issue decisions declaring mining claims 
abandoned and void for failure to timely file evidence of annual 
assessment work or a notice of intent to hold. Decisions declaring 
mining claims null and void for locating on land closed to mineral 
entry or for missing the 90 day recordation limit are still to be 
issued. Interim decisions issued for curable defects and missing 
information are to be issued as in the past.
Owners of millsites and tunnel sites that fail to file a notice of 
intent to hold are to be sent a decision calling for the required 
notice under 43 CFR 3833.2-l(c). Final decisions declaring 
delinquent millsites and tunnel sites abandoned and void are not to 
be issued until further notice.
All annual filings are to be processed and the computer records 
updated as usual. Acknowledgements are to be issued as in the past.
2
Pending the outcome of the appeal, continue to process all documents 
relating to recordation and annual filing of unpatented mining 
claims and sites. However, for untimely annual filings, process the 
filing only up to the point of issuing a decision. Ail abandoned 
and void decisions will be held in a pending status until the 
Supreme Court rules on the constitutionality of 314(c) of FLPMA.
We will issue further instructions at that time a3 to how to 
dispose of the pending abandoned and void decisions. If you have 
any questions, please contact Roger Haskins, Division of Mining Law 
and Salable Minerals, at FTS 343-8537.
E N T E R E D
\r. : i 1s£4
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA
)NL INDUSTRIES, INC., a New Jersey corporation,
Plaintiff,
JAMES A. WATT, Secretary of the 
Interior of the United States 
of America,
Defendant,
CIV-LV 82-176, PD 
Case No.
and
ALL MINERALS CORPORATION, a Nevada corporation,
Intervenor.
O R DER GRANTING AND DENYING SUMMARY JUDGMENT




In September 1967 the plaintiff NL Industries,
Inc. ("NL") located eleven unpatented mining claims on 
federal land situate in Nye County, Nevada. Thereafter, 
NL maintained the claims under the General Mining Law 
of 1872 as amended (30 U.S.C. § 22 et sec.), by 
performing annual assessment work thereon pursuant 
to 30 U.S.C. § 28.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
43 U.S.C. § 1701, et sec. ("FLPMA") became effective 
on October 21, 1976, repealing a number of outdated 
statutes and mandating the recording of unpatented 
mining claims with the federal government. Section 
1744 provides:
(a) The owner of an unpatented lode or 
placer mining claim located prior to Octo­
ber 21, 1976, shall, within the three-}ear 
period following October 21, 1976, and 
prior to December 31 of each year there­
after, file the instruments required by 
paragraphs (1) and (2) o f this subsection. 
The owner of an unpatented lode or plac­
er mining claim located after October 21, 
1976, shall, prior to December 31 of each 
year following the calendar year in which 
the said claim was located, file the instru­
ments required by paragraphs (1) and (2) 
of this subsection:
(1) File for record in the office where 
the location notice or certificate is record­
ed either a notice of intention to hold the 
mining claim (including but not limited to 
such notices as are provided by law to be 
filed when there has been a suspension or 
deferment of annual assessment work),
2
an affidavit c f  assessm ent work per­
formed thereon, on a detailed report pu>. 
vided by section 2S-1 of Title 30, relating 
thereto. •
(2) File in the office of the Bureau 
designated by the Secretary a copy of the 
official record of the instrument filed or 
recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of 
this subsection, including a description of 
the location of the mining claim suffi­
cient to locate the claimed lands on the 
ground.
Additional filing requirements
(b) The owner of an unpatented lode or 
placer mining claim or mill or tunnel site 
located prior to October 21, 1976, shall, 
within the three-year period following 
October 21, 1976, file in the office of the 
Bureau designated by the Secretary a 
copy of the official record of the notice of 
location or certificate of location, includ­
ing a description of the location of the 
mining-claim or mill or tunnel site suffi­
cient to locate the claimed lands-on the 
ground. The owner of an unpatented 
lode or placer mining claim or mill or 
tunnel site located af te r October 21, 1975, 
shall, within ninety days after the date of 
location of such claim, file in the office of 
the Bureau designated by the Secretary a 
copy of the official record of the notice of 
location or certificate of iocr.tion, includ­
ing a description of the i.'.crPc" cf. the 
mining claim or mill or t.:r.r.,-: ait* suffi­
cient U> locate the ci.iirr-d isrds or. the 
ground
Failure to file as constituting abandon­
ment; defective or untimely filing
(c) The failure tu  file such instrum ents 
as required by subsections (a) and (b) of 
this sc-clion sh ill be deemed conclusively 
to constitute an abandonm ent of the min­
ing claim or mill or tunnel site by the 
owner; but it shall not be considered a
3
failure to file if the instrument is defec- ___
tive or not timely filed for record under 
other Federal laws perm itting filing or 
recording thereof, or if the instrument is 
filed for record by or on behalf of some 
but not all of the owners of the mining 
claim or mill or tunnel site.
The plaintiff NL filed location certificates 
and copies of affidavits of assessment work for its 
mining claims with the Nevada State Office of the Bureau 
of Land Management ("SLM") in December 1977. In 
September 1979 NL filed affidavits of annual assessment 
work with the same office. BLM records show no 
evidence of the filing of affidavits of assessment 
work in calendar year 1978. The Nevada State Office 
of the BLM declared NL's claims abandoned and void for 
failure to file the required documents in 1978.
On appeal the Interior Board of Land Appeals 
("I3LA") of the Department- of the Interior affirmed 
the Nevada State Office's decision. N.L. Harold Services 
60 I3LA 90 (1981). The I3LA reasoned that the plaintiff 
NL's filing of maintenance evidence in 1977 triggered 
section 1744's annual filing requirement, thereby 
requiring NL to file maintenance evidence every year 
thereafter. Accordingly, because NL failed to file in
4
1978 the IBLA deemed the claims abandoned and void 
under section 1744(c).
The plaintiff NL takes issue .with the BLM's 
decision regarding the claims. NL interprets section 
1744 so as to allow owners of unpatented claims prior to 
October 1976 to achieve compliance by filing the required 
documents anytime within the three-year period ending 
October 22, 1979. It further contends that only after 
the three-year "grace period" ends is it required to 
make the annual assessment filings. NL therefore 
alleges that it did comply with the statute by its 
filings of 1977 and 1979 and was not required to begin 
filing annual maintenance evidence until after the end 
of the period provided by the statute.
NL asks this court to overturn the I3LA's decision 
and to declare that the NL mining claims are valid under 
FLPMA. NL has moved for summary judgment. Cross motions 
for summary judgment have been filed by the government an 
by All Minerals Corporation which was allowed to interver. 
in this action. For the reasons mentioned below and 
fully explained in NL's pleadings on file in this case, 
NL's motion for summary judgment must be granted and the 
defendants' motions must be denied.
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II. ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the IBLA erred in ruling 
that NL's mining claims were deemed abandoned and void 
for failure to comply with the governing statute. More 
specifically, this court's inquiry concerns the purposes 
behind the passage of FLPMA and the proper interpretation 
if one exists, of the word "thereafter" in § 314 of 
the Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1744, which provides that the owner 
of mining claims like NL's " . . .  shall within the 
three-vear period following the date of the approval of 
this Act [enacted Oct. 21, 1976] and prior to December 31 
of each year thereafter, file the instruments required 
. . . ." 43 USCS § 1744(a) (Law. Co-op. 1980)(emphasis
supplied) .
Defendants assert that "thereafter" refers to the 
initial filing in the three-vear period, so that from the 
time of the first filing the annual maintenance evidence 
filing requirement is in effect. Therefore, NL’s 1977 
filing of assessment work necessitated yearly filings in 
1978, 1979, 1980 and so on. Defendants rely on adminis­
trative decisions interpreting the statute and contend 
that the IBLA should be given deference by this court.
6
The department's regulations themselves, though, have no 
bearing on this decision as evidenced by the pleadings and 
oral arguments of all counsel.
The plaintiff NL maintains that "thereafter" 
refers to October 22, 1979, the end of the three-year 
grace period which Congress provided in which to comply 
with FLPMA. Under NL's interpretation the annual filing 
requirements do not take effect until after October 1979, 
regardless of when, and how often, filings are made 
within the three-year period. Thus, it contends that it 
fully complied with the statute.
It has been admitted by various administrative law 
judges within the Department and by government counsel 
Fish that the statute can reasonably be read in a number 
of ways. This court agrees, but is of the opinion that 
the most reasonable interpretation of the statute is 
plaintiff NL's reading. This is reason enough to rule 
for NL, and even if this court did not agree with NL's 
reading it still would be forced co rule .for NL because 
forfeiture provisions must be construed narrowly. 
Alarmingly, the IBLA has construed FLPMA broaclv to 
invalidate NL1s claims.
One of the purposes behind the enactment of FLPMA 
was to assist federal land managers in their responsibiliti 
by removing "stale claims" on federal land. Topaz 
Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F.Supp. 309, 313
7
(D. Utah 1979), quoting S.Rep.No. 94-583, 94th Cong. 2nd
Sess. at 64, 65 (1975). It is apparent that Congress. _ _
provided a three-vear grace period for claimants to become 
apprised of, understand, and achieve compliance with the 
new law, FL?MA. This would protect the property rights 
of claimants while establishing a system of informing the 
federal government of active claims. The forfeiture . 
provision supplied motivation to comply initially within 
the three-year period and to stay in compliance thereafter 
by making the annual filings.
NL's claims were not stale as evidenced by Si's 
filings with Nve'County and the State BLM Office. It is 
unreasonable to contend that the Congress intended to 
invalidate claims similar to NL's in light of the 
legislative history. NL did comply initially with FLPMA by 
its 1977 filings, and was not required to file evidence of 
maintenance work again until after October 22, 1979. Its 
1979 filing did not change this. Any other application 
of the law to this case would cause inequitable and 
illogical results.
A comparison of the results in N.L. Baroid, the 
IBLA's decision which NL is presently challenging, with 
the results in Harvey A. Clifton, 60 ISLA 29 (1981) and 
other I3LA decisions reveals the incongruity of the IBLA's 
and defendants' position in this case. The IBLA rulings
8
establish an unwarranted distinction between filing 
location certificates and maintenance evidence and the
resultant triggering of annual filing requirements. The 
decision in NL Baroid is arbitrary, capricious, and an 
abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the IBLA’s interpretation 
of filing requirements under FLPMA exceeds the statutory 
authority granted by Congress. The iBLA's decision in 
NL Baroid is therefore reversible notwithstanding the 
deference customarily accorded agency rulings. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1976); see also Baker v. United States, 613 F.2d 
224 (9th Cir. 1980).
III. ORDER
Plaintiff NL Industries Inc.'s motion for summary 
judgment is granted. The motions for summary jucgment of 
defendant United States and defenda.nt-in-intervention All 
Minerals Corporation are denied. The decision of the IB LA 
in N.L. Baroid Petroleum Services is reversed and remanded 
with orders to set aside its ruling and to reinstate the 
NL claims.
DATED: March 13, 1984
i
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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR; JAMES G. WATT,
Secretary of the Interior;
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT;
ROBERT F. BURFORD, Director 
of Bureau of Land Management,
Defendants.
A82-510 CIV
THIS CAUSE comes before the court on cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The basis of this action is a complaint for 
review, under the Administrative Procedure Act, of a decision by. 
the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA). In that decision, the 
IBLA affirmed a decision of the Alaska State Office, Bureau of 
Land Management, declaring certain of plaintiff's placer mining 
claims abandoned and void. See Oregon Portland Cement Co., 66 
IBLA 204,(1982). Since the facts of this case are undisputed, it 
is ripe for summary judgment.
The issue in this case is whether the IBLA and the Bureau of 
Land Management (BLM) correctly interpreted and applied Section
APR 2 4 igp/j ^
Fu&ss. Crli, $!•:-«
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
314 of the federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 * 
(hereinafter FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976). Section 314 of 
FLPMA required owners of unpatented lode or placer mining claims 
to file information relating to those claims with the BLM. The 
purposes of this filing include (1) ridding federal lands of 
stale mining claims, and (2) assuring that federal land managers 
have ready access to current information on active claims. See 
Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F . Supp. 309 , 313 (D. 
Utah 1979) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-583, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
64-65 ( 1 975 )), aff'd 649 F.2d 775 ( 1 0th Cir. 1981).1 For owners 
of unpatented placer mining claims located prior to the passage 
of FLPMA (Oct. 21, 1976) Section 314 required, first, that owners 
file certain "locating" information with BLM once prior to 
October 21, 1979, see 43 U.S.C. § 1744(b), and, second, that 
owners file either an affidavit of assessment work or a notice of 
intention to hold prior to October 21, 1979 and prior to each 
December 31 thereafter. See id. § 1 744(a). This second group of 
reports must be filed with both BLM and the official state 
recording office (generally the county public land records). 
Under Section 314, an owner who fails to meet the above filing 
requirement is deemed conclusively to have abandoned his or her 
claim. 1d . § 1744(c).
For a further discussion of the history and purposes of Section 
314 see Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States. 649 F.2d 775 (10th 
Cir. 1981 ); Topaz Beryllium Co.'.' 479 F. 5 u d d . at 312-14; Locke v. 
United States, 573 F. Supp. 472 , 477 (D. Nev . 1 983). *
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1 . Factual Backqround
The claims at issue are AO unpstented limestone placer 
mining claims at View Cove on Dali Island in the Alexander 
Archipelago of Southeastern Alaska. Oregon Portland Cement Co. 
(OPCC) originally located and recorded these claims in 1965. 
After the passage of FLP M A , in Oune 197B, OPCC filed copies of 
its official Ketchikan Recording District placer location 
certificates with BLM in Oune 1 978 pursuant to A3 U.S.C. § 
17AA(b). At the request of BLM, OPCC amended this filing in 
January, 1979 to include legal descriptions of the land on which 
the claims were located and a USGS map showing the claim loca­
tions. There is no dispute that through these filings OPCC 
complied with the "locating" requirements of A3 U.S.C. § 17AA(b). 
See a 1 so A3 C.F.R. § 3833.1-2 ( 1982) (regulations implementing 
this subsection) .
On November 8 , 1 978 , pursuant to A3 U.S.C. § 17AA(a), OPCC 
filed affidavits of assessment work for the assessment year 
ending September 1, 1978 and for the assessment year ending
September 1, 1979.2 Thus, plaintiff's affidavit of assessment
work for the assessment year ending September 1, 1979 was on file 
with the BLM throughout the entire 1979 calendar year. Neverthe­
less, the IBLA held that OCPP's claims were abandoned and void 
for failure to file assessment work during the 1979 calendar 2
2
The mining assessment year is defined in 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1976). 
Under this section, if a miner fails to do annual assessment work 
on a claim, the claim is subject to forfeiture if the claim is 
then relocated by another miner.
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year.- The IBLA reasoned that because OPCC filed proof of 
assessment work during 1978, Section 314(a) required an annual 
filing during the 1979 calendar year. Since OPCC's 1979 report 
was filed early, namely in November 1978, no proof of assessment 
work was filed during 1979 and therefore OPCC's claims were 
"abandoned." As can be seen, OPCC's only error was filing a 
required report too early!
OPCC argues that the IBLA's decision is inconsistent with 
the statutory language of Section 31A tin two areas. First, OPCC 
maintains that the statute only requires annual reports of 
assessment work to be filed after October 21, 1979, and not after 
the initial filing of assessment work. Therefore, because no 
annual filing was required in 1979, no abandonment occurred. 
Second, OPCC maintains that the statute's words "prior to 
December 31 of each year thereafter" should not .be read to 
require calendar year filing. According to this argument, OPCC's 
1979 filing of November 1978 was "prior to December 31" and 
therefore timely. These challenges to the IBLA decision are also 
a challenge to BLM's regulations implementing Section 314 for the 
reason the IBLA grounded its decision in part on those regula­
tions.
] 11 . Standard o f Review
This court's review of an IBLA decision is limited to an 
examination of whether it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
[its discretion, unsupported by substantial evidence, or not in 
accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. § 706 ( 1 982 ); Baker v . United
States t 613 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.), qert. denied 449 U.S. 932 
(1980). The court need not affirm the administrative decision if 
the decision is inconsistent with a statutory mandate or frus­
trates the policy underlying the statute. NLRB v. Brown, 380 
U.S. 278, 291 (1965); Schade,v. Andrus, 638 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 
1981)'. As was stated by the Ninth Circuit elsewhere:
The Administrative Procedure Act mandates 
that the reviewing court decide all relevant 
questions of law [and] interpret constitutional 
a nd.statutory provisions ...." 5 U.S.C. § 706.
We must nonetheless give due deference to the 
interpretation of statutes and regulations by 
the agency charged with their administration.
Loma Linda University v. Schweiker, 705 F.2d 
1123~, 1 1 26 ( 9 th Cir . 1 983 ) ; ~C,o~mmiTtee for an 
Independent P - I , 704 F.2d at 472. Our task, 
then, is not to interpret the statutes as we 
think best, but rather to inquire whether the 
Coast Guard's construction was "sufficiently 
reasonable" to be accepted. FEC v . Democratic 
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39, 102 
S. Ct. 38, 46, 70 L. Ed. 2d 23, 34 (1981). "To 
satisfy the standard it is not necessary for a 
court to find that the agency's construction 
was the only reasonable one or even the reading 
the court would have reached if the question 
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding."
Id.
Western Pioneer, Inc, v. United States, 709 F.2d 1 331 , 1 335 (9th 
Cir. 1983).
The amount of deference required and the standard of review 
for agency decisions reached by rulemaking, i.e., regulations, is 
similar to that required when agency decisions are reached by 
adjudication. See i d , Thus, implementing regulations are valid 
if they implement the mandate of Congress, as expressed in the 
statute in some reasonable way. Rowan Cos, v. United 5tates, 452 
U.S. 247, 252-53 (1981). "In determining whether a regulation
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carries out the congressional mandate in the proper manner, [a 
court must] look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with 
the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose.
I d . at 253 ; First -Charter Financial Corp. v. United States, 669 
F .2 d 13 4 2, 1348 (9th Cir.'1982). See also Committee for an 
Independent P-I v. Hearst Corp., ^04 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir.) ("A 
court is obliged to accept the administrative construction of a 
statute only so far as it is reasonable . . . and consistent with 
the intent of Congress in adopting the statute."), cert . denied 
104 S. Ct. 236 (1983)
While the court must treat the agency decision with defer­
ence in this case, the nature of the review required here tempers 
the amount of deference due. The statutory mandate in 
Section 314 regarding recording and abandonment is detailed and 
specific, not broad and general. This is unlike the situation 
where Congress has left the agertcy a mandate to define a general 
term or implement a broad policy, in which case agency discretion 
would be at its greatest. Here, Congress constrained the BLM's 
discretion by use of specific statutory language. Deference is 
therefore less appropriate. See First Charter Financial Corp., 
669 F . 2 d at 1348 .
In a similar situation, the Supreme Court stated:
The framework for analysis is refined by 
consideration of the. source of the authority to 
promulgate the regulation at issue. The 
Commissioner has promulgated Treas. Reg. §
1 .1 563-1 (a )(3) interpreting this statute only 
under his general authority to "prescribe all 
needful rules and regulations." 26 U.S.C. §
7805(a). Accordingly, "we owe the interpreta­
tion less deference than a regulation issued
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under a specific grant of authority to define a 
statutory term or prescribe a method of 
(executing a statutory provision." Rowan Cos.
v . United States t ___  U.S. ___ , ___ , 101 S. Ct.
2288 , 2292 , 6B L. Ed. 2d 81A (1981). In
addition, Treas. Reg. § 1-1563-1 (a) (3) purports 
to do no more than add a clarifying gloss on a 
term -- "brother-sister controlled group" -- 
that has already been defined with considerable 
specificity by Congress. The Commissioner's 
authority is consequently m o r e  circumscribed #
. than would be the case if Congress had used a 
term "'so general . . . as to render an 
interpretive regulation appropriate.'" Nation- 
al Huffier Dealers Assn. v. United States, 440 
U.S. 472, 476, 99 S. Ct. 1304, 1306, 59 L. Ed.
2ti 519 (1979), quoting Helvering v. R.3.
Reynolds Co., 306 U.S. 110, 114, 59 S. Ct. 423,
425, 83 L. Ed. 536 (1939). See also Rowan Cos, 
v . United 5tates, supra.
United States v. Voge1•Ferti1izer Co.,.455 U.S. 16, 24-25 (1982). 
The situation facing this court is identical to that described by 
the Vogel fertilizer Court. The BLM, in promulgating the 
regulation, was acting under a general, not a specific, grant of 
authority. See 43 U.S.C. § 1740 ( 1976). Further, in regards to 
setting filing dates, the BLM was merely clarifying specific 
statutory language rather than interpreting a general term. For 
both these reasons, in reviewing the regulations the court must' 
closely scrutinize them and give them less than maximum defer­
ence .
III. Are Annual Assessment Reports Required Prior to October 21, 
1979?
The filing requirements of FLPMA on assessment work are 
contained in Section 314(a).
§ 1744. Recordation of mining claims 
(a) Filing requirements
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* The owner of an unpstented lode or placer
mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976, 
shall, within the three-year period following 
October 21, 1976, and prior to December 31 of 
each year thereafter, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this 
subsection. The owner of an unpatented lode or 
placer mining claim located after October 21,
1976 shall, prior to December 31 of each year 
following the calendar year in.which the said 
claim was located, file the instruments 
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this 
. subsection:
(1) File for record in the office where the 
location notice or certificate is recorded 
either a notice of intention to hold the mining 
claim (including but not limited to such 
notices as are provided by law to be filed when 
there has been a suspension or deferment of 
annual assessment work), an affidavit of 
assessment work performed thereon, on a 
detailed report provided by section 2B-1 of 
Title 30, relating thereto.
(2) File in the office of the Bureau 
designated by the Secretary a copy of the 
official record of the instrument filed or 
recorded pursuant to paragraph (1) of this 
subsection, including a description of the 
location of the mining claim sufficient to 
locate the claimed lands on the ground.
FIPMA § 314, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1744 (1976).
BLM's regulations implementing this section are located at 
43 C.F.R. § 3833.2-1(a) (19B2):3
3833.2-1 When filing required.
(a) The owner of an unpatented mining claim 
located on Federal lands on or before October 
21, 1976, shall file in the proper BIM office 
on or before October 22, 1979, or on or before 
December 30 of each calendar year following the 
calendar year of such recording, which ever
The BLH regulations have been revised substantially since the 
time of the IBLA decision. The current version of this 
regulation is now located at 43 C.F.R. § 3833.2-1 (b ) ( 1 ) ( 1 983). 
Because this case involves a challenge to the regulations in 
effect in 1979, the court will only refer to the version of this 
regulation appearing in the 1982 Code of Federal Regulations.
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date is sooner, evidence of. annual assessment 
work performed during the precedino assessment 
year or a notice of inte.ntion to hold the 
mining claim.
In order to review the basis and legality of this "abandon- 
, ment" it is important to understand that there are two sets of 
j rules creating filing requirements, one statutory Bnd one 
f regulatory, and that these are inconsistent with one another.
I
 Failure to comply with either set may cause a miner to lose his 
or her claim. As noted above, Section 314 requires miners to 
file (1) a recording of location once prior to October 22 , 1979
!
(see § 314(b)), and (2) according to IBLA, affidavits of assess­
ment at least once prior to October 22, 1979 and annually after 
the initial affidavit of assessment has been filed. BLM's 
regulation, 43 C .F . R . 3833.2-1 (a) (19B2), requires filing of (1)
| a recording of location once prior to October 22, 1979 and (2) 
according to IBLA, affidavits of assessment at least once prior 
to October 22, 1979 and annually after the certificate of
; location is filed for record. See Oregon Portland Cement Co., 66 
; IBLA at 206 n.2; Harvey A. Clifton, 60 IBLA 29, 33 (1981). Given 
'• the conflict between IBLA's interpretation of the statute and its 
1 interpretation of the regulations, it becomes possible to meet 
; statutory but not regulatory filing requirements, s e e , e .q ., 
Harvey A. Clifton, supra, or to meet regulatory but not statutory
requirements, as may have occurred in this case.^ .
The IBLA based its decision in this case on statutory', not 
regulatory grounds. See 66 IBLA at 206-07. Therefore, the major . 
emphasis of this court's review will be whether the IBLA inter­
preted the statute correctly. Nevertheless, BLM's regulations 
must tie reviewed as well. The BLM interpreted the phrase "and 
prior to December 31 of each year thereafter" to require annual I 
calendar year filings during the three year 1976-1979 grace j 
period. Because the IBLA presumably relied on this interprets- j 
tion of the statute in its determination that OPCC was required j 
to file in 1979, the court must question the validity of BLM's | 
interpretation as well.
As noted above, the IBLA interpreted Section 314 to require 
proof of assessment work be filed annually within each calendar 
year following the year initial filing of assessment work 
occurred. OPCC contends, however, that the phrase "thereafter" 
refers to the phrase "within the three year period" and that 
consequently annual filings are only required after October 21, 
1979. On the other hand, the government argues that BLM's 
interpretation of the statute as requiring annual filing after 
the initial filing of assessment work is reasonable and must be 
accepted by this court. The court finds, for the reasons stated 
_
Assuming, arguendo, that the recording of location did not occur 
until all documents were submitted in 1979, then OPCC would have 
met regulatory but not statutory requirements. The court, 
however, declines to address the issue whether the final filing 
relates back to the initial filing for purposes of triggering the 
annual reporting requirement. See Marion Birch, 53 IBLA 366 
(1981).
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b e1o h t that the IBLA interpretation and BLM regulation are 
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute and therefore 
the administrative decision must be reversed.
First, a common-sense reading of the statute indicates that 
"thereafter" must modify the words "within the three-year 
period." There is no other phrase or word' that thereafter could 
possibly modify. OPCC's interpretation of the statute is the 
only reasonable interpretation available. This conclusion is 
buttressed by an analogy to a settled rule of statutory construc­
tion, the "doctrine of last antecedent." "[Ujnder the 'doctrine 
of last antecedent,' qualifying words, phrases, and clauses are 
to be applied to the words or phrase immediately proceeding, and 
are not to be construed as extending to and including others more 
remote." Azure v. H o r t o n , 514 F.2d B97, 900 (9th Cir. 1975); 
accord, First Charter Financial Corp., 669 F.2d at 1350. 
Similarly, the word "thereafter" should be read as referring to 
the immediately antecedent phrase, "within the three year 
period."
Had Congress intended that reports be filed annually after 
the initial filing, it would have required that in plain lan­
guage, as it did with claims located after October 21, 1976. In 
the sentence immediately following the one under discussion, 
Congress required owners of claims located after October 21, 1976 
to file proof of assessment work "prior to December 31 of each 
year following the calendar year in which said claim was locat­
ed." 43 U.S.C. § 1744(a). This comparison of congressional
treatment of claims 1ocated*before October 21, 1976 and those 
located after that date shows that Congress was aware of the 
problem of when to require annual filings and chose not to 
require them, at least for claims located prior to 1976, until 
after the initial three year filing period.
Th^s result is logical as well. For claims located prior to 
1976, the statute allows owners to file their initial proof of 
assessment work any time before October 1979. Thus, some owners 
would initially file assessment work in 1977, and some not until 
October 20, 1979. Because of the presence of this three-year 
grace period, BLM could not expect to have a complete record of 
mining claims until October 21, 1979. Little, if any, useful 
purpose is served by requiring annual filings prior to that date 
for the reason that BLM could not reasonably rely on their mining 
claim records until after the close of the three-year grace 
period. It is only at the close of the grace period, when the 
records would be complete, that the need to keep the records 
current arises. Consequently, no congressional purpose or policy 
is served by BLM's claim of abandonment-. See also NL Industries, 
Inc, v. W a t t , No. CIV-LV 82-176, RDF (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 1984) 
(finding BLM's position on annual filings to be inequitable and 
illogical).
The logic of this interpretation is supported by examining 
the structure of the whole section. Section 314(b) requires that 
information on the mining claim's location be filed prior to 
October 22, 1979. The statute does not require, contrary to
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Judge Stuebing’s suggestion in his dissent to Clifton,.»that the
recordation of the notice or location must precede (or be made 
simultaneous with) the filing of one of the other documents 
described in [Section 314(a)]." 60 IBLA at 41. However, while 
the statute does not require this, logic certainly does. See id. 
at 41-42. The only way to harmonize the filing requirements of 
314(a) and (b) is to interpret 314(a) as requiring annual reports 
after the three-year grace period. To read 314(a) otherwise 
leads to the anomalous result, noted by Judge Stuebing, of 
requiring annual assessment reports before a claim is officially 
recorded and located with the BLM. Such annual reports would be 
of little, if any, use to BLM because information on the 
location of the claim would not also available.
Finally, the court notes that forfeiture provisions must be 
construed narrowly. 5ee Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 623  
F .2 d 1037, 1044 (2d Cir. 19 80). BLM has construed Section 314  
broadly to create forfeiture in questionable situations. For 
this reason, and the other reasons stated above, the court finds 
that Section 314 only requires that one.proof of assessment work 
or notice of intent to hold and one recordation of location be 
filed prior to October 22, 1979. IBLA’s decision below is 
contrary to law and must be reversed.
IY. Must Affidavits of Assessment be Filed After January 1?
OP C C also argues that the IBLA and BLM erred in requiring 
affidavits of assessment to be filed after January 1 rather than 
any time after the assessment work was completed. Because the
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statute merely requires affidavits be filed ''prior to December 31 
of each year thereafter", OPCC claims that its November 1978 
affidavit, having been filed "prior to" December 31, met statu­
tory requirements.
This portion of the controversy arises in part because the 
mining assessment year does not coincide with the calendar year. 
In order to avoid forfeiting their claims, miners must do 
assessment work each assessment year. See 30 U.S.C. 28 (1976). 
For purposes of this forfeiture statute, the assessment year runs 
from noon September 1 until noon September 1. 30 U.S.C. § 28. As 
is a common industry practice, OPCC scheduled their assessment 
work to overlap both ends of the September 1, 1978 new assessment 
year. See 66 IBLA at 209. This allowed them to save substantial 
time and expense, given the remote location of the claim. OPCC 
then prepared affidavits of assessment for both the 1978 and 1979 
assessment years and filed these with the local authority as 
required by 49 U.S.C. § 49(e) (1976) and Section 314(a)(1) and 
with the BLM pursuant to 314(a)(2).
The court finds strong evidence it was Congress' intent to 
accommodate the mining practices followed by OPCC. First, 
Congress clearly was aware of the assessment year concept in 
passing Section 314. It referred to 30 U.S.C. § 28-1, which 
requires local filing of work on an assessment year basis. It 
also made specific reference to "calendar" years elsewhere in 
Section 314, i.e., in its discussion of claims filed after 
October 21, 1976. Given congressional awareness of the assessment
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ye dr and mip i n g practices, it becomes significant that the 
statute does not specifically require calendar year filing. When 
Congress wanted action based on the calendar year elsewhere in 
the statute, it specifically required it. Second, Congress only 
set a closing date for filing. Viewed in light of the statute's 
background, it is reasonable to assume that the purpose of the 
phrasing is to accommodate assessment practices, namely to allow 
filing any time after assessment work is completed. 5 Third, the 
requirement of a December 31 filing deadline is at least as 
consistent with congressional intent to create a four-month grace 
period between the end of the assessment year and the filing 
deadline as it is with intent to create calendar year filing.
The court therefore concludes it is reasonable to interpret 
Section 314 to allow early filing of assessment work. Because 
deference must be given to an agency's interpretation of a 
statute, this court must nevertheless accept BLM's interpretation 
so long as it is reasonable and consistent with statutory 
mandate.
The court agrees with the IBLA that the statute is amenable 
to the interpretation given it by the BLM. See James V. Joyce, 
.56 IBLA 327, 329 (1981) (on reconsideration). However, because 
no reasonable administrative purpose is furthered by BLM's 
interpretation of Section 314, the agency interpretation places 5
5
Congress acknowledged these practices and shaped a statute to 
accommodate them elsewhere. See 30 U.S.C. § 28-1 (1976) (allow­
ing one survey of a mining claim to be applied as assessment 
labor for two consecutive years). .
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additional administrative burden on mine owners without justifi­
cation. In addition, the agency'9 disregard of established 
mining practices in establishing a calendar year filing system is 
arbitrary and capricious. Because the agency was arbitrary in 
ignoring established mining practices and because no justifica­
tion supports BLH's use of the calendar year in establishing 
filing requirements for filing proof of assessment work, the 
agency's interpretation of the statute is unreasonable.
The government claims that if BLM is not allowed to; use a 
calendar year system, a major purpose of Section 314, keeping BLM 
informed of the continued interest of claimants in claims will be 
frustrated. The court agrees that keeping BLM records current is 
important. However, it cannot agree with the government's 
protestations of impending doom if BLM is required to recognize 
filings of assessment work of the type that occurred in this 
case. Under a calendar year system, federal land managers must 
look back in the claim file twelve months to determine if there 
is continued interest in the claim (from Dec. 30 to Jan. 1). If 
mine owners are allowed to file assessment work any time after it 
is performed, the only change would be that land managers would 
be required to look back in the file sixteen months (from Dec. 30 
to the previous Sept. 1). This change of four months should not 
impair the usefulness of the records to federal officials.
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The IBLA stated in James V. J o y c e , supra, that if early 
Filing were allowed for assessment work, the same logic would 
require early filing of notices of intent to hold claim.6 "Thus, 
an individual could file in one year separate documents manifest­
ing an intent to hold for each of the next 5 years." 56 IBLA at 
330. This argument lacks merit, however. There is no language 
in the statute that requires notices of intention to hold to be 
treated identically with affidavits of assessment work. BLM 
easily could have created different filing dates for different 
types- of filing.^ in other words, the logic that supports 
allowing affidavits be filed within the four-month period prior 
to a calendar year does not support allowing notices to be filed 
10 years in advance, as IBLA contends.
The government also argues that
to permit a mining claimant to file proof of 
assessment work in the last A months of the 
calendar year in which it should be filed, 
albeit within the assessment year, would permit 
a mining claimant to effectively skip filing 
proof of assessment every other year. . . .
For instance, a mining claimant could file in 
November 1978 for the 1979 assessment year and 
file in December 1980 for the 1.980 assessment 
year, effectively skipping any filing in 1979.
According to the statute and regulations, mine owners may file a 
notice of intention to hold claim as a substitute for proof of 
assessment work. See, e . g ♦ , A3 C.F.R. § 3833.2-3(a) ( 1983).
Or else, BLM could require both notices of intention to hold and 
affidavits of assessment be filed within the sixteen month 
September to December period. The statute does not forbid BLM 
from setting an opening date for filing. However, the opening 
date set by BLM must be reasonable.
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See Oregon Portland Cement Co., 66 IBLA at 210. The court agrees 
this result is possible, but doubts requiring annual filing will 
lead to a markedly different result. In the government's 
hypothetical, 25 months elapse between filings. Under a calendar 
year filing system, the November 1978 filing could be filed 
January 1 979 instead and the 1 980 filing in December,; 1980, as 
before. Thus, the result of requiring calendar year filing is 
merely to reduce the complained of gap between filings from 25 to 
23 months. The court does not find that the statute's purposes 
or congressional intent will be furthered by reducing the gap 
between filings by two months.
In the decision below, the IBLA spent considerable effort 
analyzing the concept of a "notice of intention to hold" and 
| whether Congress intended that Section 314 work to enforce the 
assessment requirements of 30 U.S.C. § 28 and 28-1. The court 
does not argue with the IBLA's analysis on these points. However,
: there is no logical connection between this analysis and the 
IBLA's conclusion, namely "the assessment year simply has no 
| relevance to recordation." 66 IBLA at 210. The mere fact that 
! the assessment year is a mining practice of long standing is 
I sufficient to make it relevant. As the IBLA admitted: "We
j recognize that it is a common practice for mineral claimants to 
; work over the end of an assessment year and thereby fulfill the 
labor requirements for 2 years." I d . at 209. In promulgating 
| regulations under Section 314, BLM was not writing on a blank 
slate. It was working in the context of well-established mining
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industry practices, practices of which Congress was aware. For 
IBLA to say that industry practices should have no relevance to 
agency regulations is simply wrong. Rather, the agency's failure 
to consider an existing statutory scheme (30 U.S.C. § § 2 8 and 
28-1 ) and industry practices in promulgating regulations is both 
arbitrary and capricious.8
Finally, the facts of this case speak for themselves. For 
an agency to declare mining claims abndoned because proof of 
assessment work was filed two months too early is inherently 
unreasonajble. The arguments offered by the government and the 
IBLA in support of the IBLA decision do not offer reasonable 
support for the government's position or show why this inherently 
unreasonable decision should be considered reasonable.
Accordingly, the court holds that the agency's decision to 
disregard the November 1978 filing was arbitrary, capricious, 
and, because the regulation does not interpret the statute in a 
reasonable manner, contrary to law.^
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:
(1) THAT plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is 
granted;
One relevant and important consideration is convenience of the 
miners. For the reasons stated above, no significant government 
interest is furthered by requiring miners to make two separate 
trips to the BLM, one prior to December 31 and one in January, 
when all papers are presumably prepared and ready to be filed at 
one time .
The court does not reach the issue whether the conclusive 
presumption of abandonment in the face of evidence to the 
contrary violates due process. See Rogers v. United States, 575 
F. Supp. 4 (D. Mont. 1982); Locke v. United States, 573 F. Supp. 
472 (D. Nev. 1983).
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(2) THAT defendants’* motion for summary judgment is denied;
(3) THAT the decision of the IBLA in Oregon Portland Cement 
Co. , 66 IBLA 204, is reversed and this case is remanded;
(4) THAT the IBLA take such further actions as are required 
by this opinion.
, DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 19th day of April, 1984.
United States District
cc: Richard E. McCann
U . S . Attorney
P CM I -20-
CIV 31 
!« •*  3 /13)
JUDGMENT SN A CIVIL CASE
PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY , a 
Nevada corporation,






UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR? JAMES G. WATT, et al.
NAME OF JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE "V
James A von der Heydt̂ '̂ '-SkÛ  D
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43 CFR Parts 3710, 3720, 3730, 3740, 
3800, 3810, 3820, 3830, 3840, 3850, 
3850 and 3870
Intent to Propose Rulemaking 
a g e n c y : Bureau of Land Management 
Interior.
action: Notice of intent to propose 
rulemaking.
summary: As part of the Department of 
the Interior's ongoing effort to
57522 Federal Register /  Vol. 47. No. 248 /  Monday. December 27. 1982 /  Proposed Rules
streamline existing regulations, the 
Bureau of Land Management is 
considering the revision of regulations 
found at 43 CFR Groups 3700 and 3B00 
dealing with acquisition of rights and 
development of mineral resources under 
the mining laws. 30 U.S.C. 22 et scq.. and 
other special Acts of Congress. Public 
comment is invited as to how the 
regulations found at 43 CFR Groups 3700 
and 3B00, other than subparts ‘JS02, 3809, 
and 3833, could be improved, whether 
by elimination of unnecessary or 
burdensome provisions, by the 
clarification or amplification of 
ambiguous p rovisions, or by the 
inclusion of standards or procedures not 
now found in the regulations. In 
furtherance ■ f the Department of the 
Interior's po icy of seeking public input, 
the public is invited to arrange meetings 
with represi ntatives of the Director, 
Bureau of Land Management, to discuss, 
for the record, their comments. 
d a t e : Comments should be submitted 
by February 1.1983. Comments received 
or postmarked after that date will be 
considerec if it is practical to do so. but 
assurance cannot be given that any 
comments except those received or 
postmarked on or before this date will 
be given consideration.
A D D rtssc : Written ccm m e m s should be 
addressed to: Director (140), Bureau of 
Land Management, 10th and C Streets, 
NW.. Washington, D.C. 20240,
Comments will be available for public 
review in Room 5555 of the above 
address during regular business hours 
(7:45 a.m. to 4:15 p.m.j, Monday through 
Friday.
Those wishing to arrange meetings to 
present comments should contact the 
Assistant Director, Mineral Resources at 
(202) 343-5554 to schedule their 
presentation. A record will be made of 
ali meetings, will be made part of the 
comment docket, and will be available 
for public review. The record will 
include the name, address and 
organizational affiliation of any 
individual participating in the meetings 
concerning this proposal.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT! 
William Condit, Bureau of Land 
Management, 18th and C Streets, NW„ 
Washington, D.C. 20240: telephone (202) 
343-8537.
SUPPLEM ENTARY INFORMATION: The
public is invited to submit comments on, 
but not limited to. the following issues:
1. Procedures for patenting mining 
claims and mill sites under the m ining  
laws;
2. Definition, consistent with existing 
case law, of discovery of a valuable 
mineral deposit (including the concepts
of the prudent man rule and 
marketability):
3. Definition of the term “valid mining 
claim*’;
4. Clarification of the distinction 
between an amended location and a 
relocation;
5. Method of showing a patent 
applicant's title to a claim; and
8. Definition of the showing to be 
made to support a mining claimant’s 
allegation of discovery.
Because of their special interest, 
members of the public who conduct 
mining activities that may be affected 
by the regulations in 43 CFR Groups 
37CO and 3000. other than Subparts 3802, 
3809 and 3833. are asked to give careful 
consideration to these parts and submit 
their comments for consideration.
Because the regulations found at 43 
CFR Subparts 3002. 3809, and 3833 have 
been the subject of recent rulemaking 
and proposed rulemaking, the Bureau of 
Land Management will review those 
regulations separately from this notice 
of intent. Accordingly, comments on 
those parts are not specifically solicited.
List of Subjects 
43  C F R  P a r t  3 71 0  
Administrative practice and 
procedure. Mines, Public lands—Mineral 
resources.
43 C F R  P a r t  3720
Coal. Mineral royalties, Mines, Public 
lands—Mineral resources.
43  C F R  P a r t  3 7 3 0
Environmental protection. Mines. 
Public lands—Mineral resources.
43 C F R  P a r t  3 740  
Administrative practice and 
procedure. Mines, Public lands—Mineral 
resources.
43 C F R  P a r t  3 600
Administrative p: ictice and 
procedure, Environmental protection, 
Intergovernmental relations. Mines, 
Public lands. Surety bonds. Wilderness 
areas.
43  C F R  Pa rt  3 610
Mines, Public lar.Js—C^ssificadon, 
Public lands—Mineral resources.
43  C F R  P a r t  362 0
Minus, Monuinen-s am memorials, 
National forests, National parks, Public 
lands—Mineral resources.
43  C F R  P a rt  3 8 3 0
Mines, Public lands—Mineral 
resources.
43 CFR P a rt 3640  ~
Mines. Public lands—Mineral 
resources.
43  C F R  P a rt  3850  
Mines. Public landB—Mineral 
resources.
43  C F R  P a rt  3360  
Administrative practice and 
procedure, Mines. Public lands—Mineral 
resources.
43  C F R  P a rt  3370  
Administrative practice and 
procedure, Mines, Public lands— 
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